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Abstract 
Recently, Yang et al. (Quantum Inf Process:17:129, 2018) proposed a secure multi-
party quantum summation protocol allowing the involved participants to sum their 
secrets privately. They claimed that the proposed protocol can prevent each 
participant’s secret from being known by others. However, this study shows that the 
participant who prepares the initial quantum states can obtain other participants’ secrets 
with an inverse quantum Fourier transform attack. A modification is then proposed here 
to solve this problem. 
Keywords Quantum summation. Inverse quantum Fourier transform attack. Secure 
quantum computation. 
1. Introduction 
The task of secure multi-party quantum summation (SMQS) is helping the involved 
participants to obtain the summation of their secrets, and at the same time, the 
participants’ secrets can be kept in privacy. In 2007, Du et al. [1] designed an SMQS 
protocol based on single photons. Then, to improve the efficiency of Du et al.’s SMQS 
protocol, Chen et al. [2] designed an efficient SMQS protocol with GHZ states, Zhang 
et al. [3] proposed a high-capacity SMQS protocol where both of the polarization and 
the spatial-mode degrees of freedom are used. In addition, several other SMQS 
protocols have been proposed [4-8]. 
Recently, Yang et al. [9] proposed an SMQS protocol based on quantum Fourier 
transform and claimed that their protocol can avoid both of the outside attacks and the 
inside attacks. However, this study shows that the participant who generates the initial 
particles can use an inverse quantum Fourier transform attack to obtain other 
participants’ secrets. Then, a simple solution is hence proposed here. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews Yang et 
al.’s SMQS protocol. Section 3 first shows the details of the inverse quantum Fourier 
transform attack on Yang et al.’s protocol and then proposes a modified method. At last, 
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a brief conclusion is given in Section 4. 
2. Brief review of Yang et al.’s SMQS protocol [9] 
Before reviewing Yang et al.’s SMQS protocol, it is necessary to briefly introduce some 
background first. 
2.1 Background 
In Yang et al.’s protocol, the -leveld transformation operation kU , -leveld quantum 
Fourier transform operation QFT  and their applications on the -leveld -particlen
entangled state 
1 2 na a a
  are used. Assume  ( 0,1, , 1 )r r d   is a -leveld  
single particle, then the kU , QFT and 
1 2 na a a
  can be respectively described as 
follows: 
  0,1, , 1kU r k r k d                  (1) 
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where        1 1 2 2 1 2 modn n nl k l k l k k k k d          .  
2.2 Yang et al.’s SMQS protocol 
Suppose that there are n   participants  1 2, , , nP P P   who want to obtain the 
summation of their private integer strings. Let iP  ’s private integer string is  
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 1 2= , , , mi i i iK k k k  where  1, 2, ,i n  and m  is the length of iK . Then Yang 
et al.’s SMQS protocol can be presented step by step as follows: 
Step 1 1P  generates m  entangled states in 
1 2 na a a
  and picks out all the thi  
particles ia   in 
1 2 na a a
   to construct n   ordered particle sequences 
 1 2, , , nS S S   where  1 2= , , , mi i i iS a a a  .  Subsequently, 1P   inserts 
enough decoy particles into   2,3, ,iS i n  to obtain new sequences iS   
where each decoy particle is randomly generated with 1-basisV  or 2 -basisV , 
here,   1= ( 0,1, , 1 )V r r d    and   2 ( 0,1, , 1 )V QFT r r d    . 
Then 1P  sends iS   to iP  and keeps 1S  in his/her hand. 
Step 2 Upon receiving iS  ,   2,3, ,iP i n  and 1P  use the decoy particles to 
check whether there is an eavesdropper in the particles transmission process. If 
the error rate exceeds a predetermined value, they abort this protocol. Otherwise, 
  2,3, ,iP i n  discards the decoy particles in iS    to get =iS
 1 2, , , mi i ia a a  and continues the next step. 
Step 3 Each participant   1, 2, ,iP i n  encodes his/her private integer iK  on 
iS   by performing j
ik
U QFT   on the particle   1,2, ,jia j m   and uses 
1-basisV  to measure all the particles to obtain the corresponding measurement 
results  1 2= , , , mi i i iR r r r   where j j ji i ir k l   . Finally, 
  2,3, ,iP i n  announces iR  to 1P . 
Step 4 Upon obtaining all the iR , according to formula (4), 1P  can get the summation 
of all the participants’ private integer strings iK   with 
1 2 nSum R R R    . In detail, 1 2 1 1 2nSum R R R K L K      
4 
 
2 n nL K L    1 2 nK K K     . Then, 1P  announces Sum  to 
  2,3, ,iP i n . 
 
3. Attack and modification on Yang et al.’s SMQS protocol  
Yang et al. [9] claimed that the above protocol can prevent each participant’s private 
integer string   1, 2, ,iK i n  from being known by others. However, this section 
shows that, in Yang et al.’s secure multi-party quantum summation protocol, 1P  can 
use an inverse quantum Fourier transform attack to obtain other participants’ private 
integer strings   2,3, ,iK i n  . Then, to solve this problem, a modification is 
proposed. 
3.1 The Inverse Quantum Fourier Transform Attack  
In Step 2, the participants just use decoy particles to check whether there is an 
eavesdropper in the particle transmission processes, but do not check the correctness of 
the initial states 
1 2 na a a
 . Hence, if 1P  is a malicious participant and he/she sends 
fake initial states to other participants in Step 1, he/she can obtain other participants’ 
private integer strings. That is, in Step 1, 1P  generates the fake single particles 
1QFT r  instead of the states 
1 2 na a a
   where 1QFT   is the -leveld  inverse 
quantum Fourier transform operation and 
21
1
0
1
=
ixrd
d
x
QFT r e x
d



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sends these particles with decoy particles to iP . After the eavesdropper detection with 
decoy particles in Step 2, iP  will encode his/her private integer strings by performing 
j
ik
U QFT  on 1QFT r  in Step 3. The result of 1j
ik
U QFTQFT r  is jir k  
and the details are shown as follows: 
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Subsequently, iP  uses 1-basisV   to measure all the particles and announces the 
measurement results  1 2= , , , mi i i iR r k r k r k   . In Step 4, after 1P  obtains all 
the iR  , he/she can use the formula 
j j
i ir k r k    to get all the private integer 
strings  1 2= , , , mi i i iK k k k .  
For example, assume that there are three participants  1 2 3, ,P P P  who want to 
sum their private integer strings  1 2 3, ,K K K . For simplify, there is just one integer in 
each string, 1 2 34, 5, 6K K K   . In Step 1, if 1P  sends the fake state 
1 2QFT   
to 2P  and 3P . Then, after 2P  performs 5U QFT  on 
1 2QFT  , the fake state will 
be transformed to 7  and the measurement result 2R  will be 7  . Similarly, 3P  
will obtain the measurement result 3 =8R  . Upon receiving 2 =7R  and 3 =8R  , 1P  
will know that 2P ’s private integer is 7 2=5  and 3P ’s private integer is 8 2=6 . 
Hence, 1P  can obtain other participants’ private integer by the inverse quantum 
Fourier transform attack. 
6 
 
3.2 Modification on Yang et al.’s SMQS protocol 
Because the participants do not check the correctness of the initial states in the protocol, 
1P  can use the inverse quantum Fourier transform attack to get other participants’ 
private integer strings. Thus, if a process for checking whether the initial states 
1 2 na a a
  are correct or not is added, then the problem can be solved. The checking 
method of 
1 2 na a a
  used is based on [10]. The modified version is as follows. 
Step 1* 1P   generates +m    entangled states in 
1 2 na a a
   and constructs n  
ordered particle sequences  1 2 += , , , mi i i iS a a a   similarly. The rest parts of 
Step 1* are the same as the Step 1 in Section 2. 
Step 2* (the same as Step 2 in Section 2.) 
Step 3* For checking the correctness of the initial states 
1 2 na a a
 , each participant 
  2,3, ,iP i n  randomly picks out 
1n


 states from all the initial states 
as checking states. For each picked state, iP  randomly chooses a measurement 
basis from  1 2,V V  and announces the checking state position and the 
corresponding chosen basis. Then, each participant performs a QFT  
operation on the corresponding particle and uses the chosen basis to measure it. 
After that, 1P  first announces his measurement result, and then all the other 
participants announce their measurement results. According to Eq. (4) where 
0ik  , if the chosen basis is 1V , the summation of all the measurement results 
will be 0 when it is divided by d . And if the chosen basis is 2V , according to 
1 2 1 2
1
0
1
=
n n
d
n
a a a a a a
r
QFT QFT r QFT r QFT r
d




  , all the 
measurement results will be the same. Hence, if all the corresponding 
measurement results are correct, they discard these checking states and continue 
7 
 
the next step. Otherwise, they abort this protocol.  
Step 4* and Step 5* are the same as Step 3 and Step 4 in Section 2, respectively. 
With this checking process, the participants can ensure that the shared initial states 
are 
1 2 na a a
  [10]. Hence, the inverse quantum Fourier transform attack mentioned 
earlier can be avoided. 
4. Conclusions 
Yang et al. proposed an SMQS protocol based on quantum Fourier transform operation. 
However, this study points out a loophole in the protocol. With the loophole, a 
malicious participant 1P  may obtain other participants’ private integer strings with an 
inverse quantum Fourier transform attack. An improvement is hence proposed to avoid 
this loophole. 
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